## INSECURITY ENGINEERING: Analysis of Design Defects











## PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONTAINERS



#### INSECURITY ENGINEERING

#### DEFICIENT OR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS

Intersection of mechanical and security engineering

#### **♦ FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY**

- What appears secure is not
- How do you know the difference?
- Undue reliance on standards
- ♦ MISREPRESENTATIONS BY MFG

## MANUFACTURER RESPONSIBILITIES

- ◆ UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPETENCE
  - MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
  - SECURITY ENGINEERING
- **♦ IMPLIED REPRESENTATIONS** 
  - "WE ARE EXPERTS"
  - SECURITY OF THEIR PRODUCTS
  - REPRESENTATIONS
  - "WE MEET OR EXCEED STANDARDS"

# EXPERTISE REQUIRED IN LOCK DESIGN

- ◆ MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
- SECURITY ENGINEERING
- MINIMUM INDUSTRY STANDARDS REQUIRE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE
- ◆ SECURITY ENGINEERING REQUIRES:
  - UNDERSTAND USE OF WIRES,
    MAGNETS, PAPERCLIPS, BALL POINT
    PENS, ALUMINUM FOIL....
  - BYPASS TECHNIQUES

## ENGINEERING FAILURES: RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES

- ◆ INSECURITY ENGINEERING
  - Insecure products
  - Often easily bypassed
  - Products look great but not secure
  - False sense of security
  - Drug containers: deadly consequences

# COST AND APPEARANCE v. QUALITY AND SECURITY

- ◆ DO YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR?
- ◆ 2\$ LOCKS ARE 2\$ LOCKS!
- SHORTCUTS DO NOT EQUAL SECURITY
- CLEVER DESIGNS MAY REDUCE SECURITY
- PATENTS NOT GUARANTEE
   SECURITY

# EXAMPLES: INSECURITY ENGINEERING

- ◆ PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAFES
  - Four models tested, all defective
- ◆ BIOMETRIC FINGERPRINT LOCK
- ♦ ELECTRONIC RFID LOCK
- ◆ CONSUMER ELECTRONIC SAFE
  - All appear secure: None are!
  - This year, focus on wider problem
  - Representative sample

#### DRUG SAFES: WHY NEEDED

- ♦ 63,000 Opioid deaths last year
- ♦ Access to prescription drugs by kids
- Answer: prevent access
- ♦ Analyzed four major brands: all easily open
  - LockMed
  - Saferlock
  - Pillpod
  - Vaultz

### LOCKMED: LOCKED



### LOCKMED: UNLOCKED



#### LOCKMED OPEN



## PILLPOD



### **PILLPOD**



## PILLPOD OPENING



## SAFERLOCK




### SAFERLOCK CAP DETAIL



### VAULTZ



#### VAULTZ LOCK OPENING



# DRUG CONTAINERS: Opening in seconds

- ♦ All defective designs
- Offer little protection
- Simple locking mechanisms
- ♦ Kids can open
- ♦ Are they better than nothing?
- ♦ False sense of security

# TRADITIONAL LOCK DESIGN DEFECTS

- ♦ KWIKSET OLD DESIGN
- ◆ RFID-BASED DEADBOLT
- ♦ ELECTRONIC SAFE
- ♦ FINGERPRINT LOCK

# EXAMPLE #1: KWIKSET SMART KEY®



#### KWIKSET SMART KEY®

- ◆ ABOUT \$2 TO MANUFACTURER LOCKING ELEMENT
- ◆ CLEVER DESIGN: RE-PROGRAMMABLE
- ♦ MILLIONS SOLD EVERY YEAR
- ◆ EXTREMELY POPULAR LOCK
- ◆ HAS BEEN REDESIGNED

#### KWIKSET ATTRIBUTES


- CLEVER DESIGN
- ◆ PROGRAMMABLE
- COPIED AND MODIFIED EARLIER DESIGNS
- ◆ CANNOT BUMP, BUT NOT DESIGNED TO BE BUMP RESISTANT
- ◆ DIFFICULT TO PICK
- ◆ RATINGS

### HOW SMART KEY WORKS











## SMARTKEY PRINCIPLE



# ADJUSTABLE SLIDERS = KEY BITTING DEPTHS



# SLIDERS = SMARTKEY SECURITY



### OPEN IN THIRTY SECONDS: SCREWDRIVER + VICE GRIP + KEY



## OPEN IN THIRTY SECONDS



## EXAMPLE #3: KABA IN-SYNC RFID-BASED LOCK




### INSYNC RFID KEY LOCK




#### KABA IN-SYNC ATTRIBUTES

- WIDE APPLICATOIN
- AVAILABLE FOR SEVERAL YEARS
- MILITARY AND CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS
- ♦ USE SIMULATED PLASTIC KEY WITH RFID
- ◆ AUDIT TRAIL


# IN-SYNC INTERNAL MECHANISM: LOCKING



## BOLT RETRACTS



## TURN TO OPEN



#### **INSYNC-D MARKETS**

- **♦** COMMERCIAL
- APARTMENT COMPLEXES
- MILITARY FACILITIES AND HOUSING
- **♦** CHURCHES

### INSYNC MEETS PAPERCLIP



## KABA INSYNC: INSECURITY 101



### EXAMPLE #4: AMSEC ES1014 CONSUMER "SAFE"



#### ELECTRONIC KEYPAD



### AMSEC SAFE ES1014 AND OTHERS

- ◆ CONSUMER LEVEL SAFE
- ◆ \$100 FOR SMALLEST UNIT
- **♦** ELECTRONIC KEYPAD
- ◆ HOW MUCH SECURITY EXPECTED?
- **♦ INCOMPETENT DESIGN**
- ♦ FOUND IN MANY OTHER SAFES
- CHINESE IMPORT

### AMSEC: INSECURITY RESET



# AMSEC SAFE: INSECURITY 101



### FILE FOLDER "SLIM JIM"



# FILE THIS UNDER INCOMPETENCE



### OPEN SESAME!



### EXAMPLE #5: BIOLOCK 333



#### BIOMETRIC LOCK

- ◆ FINGERPRINT + BYPASS CYLINDER
- **♦ LOOKS SECURE**
- ◆ \$200 OR MORE
- ♦ INSECURITY ENGINEERING AT ITS BEST

## BYPASS LOCK = BYPASS SECURITY



## PAPERCLIP: HIGH-TECH BYPASS FOR BIOLOCK



#### LESSONS LEARNED

- ◆ CLEVER ≠ SECURITY
- ◆ LOCKS REQUIRE BOTH MECHANICAL AND SECURITY ENGINEERING
- ◆ PATENTS DON'T GUARANTEE SECURITY
- STANDARDS DO NOT MEAN SECURITY



### INSECURITY ENGINEERING: Locks, Lies, and Videotape

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